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COVID-19 and the ‘Myriad’: A Comparative Assessment of Emergency 
Responses from Europe & South America  
 




The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted – across intricate borders, different geographies, 
and legal jurisdictions – that there is only so much that can be done in the way of 
governance to tackle the challenge posed by a virus. The pandemic is a global problem, one 
which has affected almost every country in significant and seldom-felt ways. Governments 
have been forced to react, to respond with emergency measures, temporary rules and 
legislation, and impose restrictions on freedoms. It has brought to the fore a range of 
responses, locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally. What is particularly evident 
across the unfolding of the pandemic is the divergent approaches in introducing governance 
measures to control behaviour, to share data and information, and to report on the pandemic 
while holding decision-makers to account.  
 
Much of the reporting of government reactions to the pandemic have focussed on 
emergency restrictions, lockdowns, the suspension of ‘normal’ gatherings, public health 
data, and tracing apps. Each of these is bundled up with concerns over the interferences 
with freedoms, a lack of scrutiny and holding to account of governance bodies and 
lawmakers, and privacy concerns. The new ways of working, governing, and communicating 
emergency rules is a COVID-19 legacy for governments, but is one that will shift our 
expectations? The balance between fundamental freedoms has been – to an extent – pitted 
against the public health agenda and the nature of the emergency response by governments 
across the world, but particularly in Germany, the UK and South America.  
 
This paper explores the nature of the government responses through emergency measures 
(and restrictions) and tracing programmes in three countries: Germany, the UK, and 
Colombia. The assessment – and comparison – of three countries, across two diverse 
regions – offers a unique discussion from the perspective of pandemic responses to the 
COVID-19 emergency. The pandemic itself provides an opportunity to compare countries, 
governance responses, and legalities that may not otherwise be possible. The myriad of 
responses seen throughout the pandemic offers a unique opportunity for comparative 
discussion – this paper provides that discussion, but in so doing, assesses whether it is 
possible to recommend a ‘one size fits all’ approach to governance emergencies.  
 
 
Keywords: COVID-19; emergency rules; government restrictions; pandemic laws. 
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1 Introduction: COVID-19 Responses  
 
Emergency regulations and responses have been – and continue to be – imposed as the 
pandemic unfolds. The challenges for governments have unfolded in much the same way as 
pandemic ‘milestones’ – unpredictable and confusing. The pandemic has presented itself as 
something of a metaphor for the imploding of legal scrutiny, accountability, and in some 
jurisdictions, transparency. It continues to threaten – in unprecedented ways – fundamental 
rights and freedoms, with responses imposed through oft-claimed ‘rapid’ means via 
emergency legislative procedures. In times of crisis, such as COVID-19, norms have shifted 
with remarkable speed – what was normal weeks ago is now the exception. The 
management of the pandemic responses has therefore played out through what can – at 
best – be described as piecemeal governmental reactions – but with an emphatic impact on 
daily life and freedoms. 
 
The different responses to infections play out in the responses to the management of the 
virus within – and across – borders, whilst compounding existing governance problems. 
Local borders and emergency rules, temporary legislation and rapid reactions pose 
challenges for established norms of governance and law-making. These are particularly 
challenging when faced with the virus – the nature of the restrictions imposed to protect 
public health has meant that usual routes of scrutiny of emergency measures, and law-
making have been bypassed. This paper explores the role of emergency governance and 
compares responses in Europe to those in South America, commenting on the nature of 
lessons that can be learnt in geographically, jurisdictionally, politically and governmentally 
diverse countries. 
 
1.1. Comparator Jurisdictions    
 
This paper will explore the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic played out through 
emergency regulations introduced in response to an unprecedented global pandemic from 
the perspective of what is an ongoing public health, but also governmental emergency.  The 
changes made by Parliaments, Governments, and regional authorities are claimed to be in 
the best interests of society, to protect public health. Yet, as will become apparent in the 
following discussion, an examination of the myriad of responses to the pandemic in 
Germany, the responses across the UK, and selected South American states, shows that 
such changes have had profound impacts – arguably upon infection rates, but also on 
liberty.  
 
The selection of the chosen jurisdictions – namely Germany, the United Kingdom, and South 
America, but especially Colombia – has been made based on the fertile ground for 
comparison, on political, societal, and not, least, regional grounds.1 The reactions to the 
pandemic in Europe and the United Kingdom have been different to the responses 
experienced in South America. Of particular interest in the selection of these jurisdictions 
and countries is their political culture, governmental arrangements, and COVID-19 
responses. In this regard, the German model is compared to the UK, and in turn, the centrist 
approach of Colombia. These comparisons offer a unique flavour to the discussion which 
brings together multi-jurisdictional examples. This assessment focuses on the governmental 
arrangements and responses, and their impact on fundamental freedoms (see below at 
1.3.).  
 
These perspectives have been selected because they represent areas of significant 
difference in national governance. Three countries with some shared similarities – including 
similar population sizes – and some substantial differences – constitutional and governance 
arrangements – offer significant potential to assess their respective emergency governance 
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responses to COVID-19. The three selected countries share other aspects. All three have 
consistently held a place in the top 20 countries by infection rate throughout the pandemic. 
Beyond this, these countries, while being geographically, jurisdictionally, culturally, 
politically, and socially diverse, are also legally diverse. As such, comparisons may not 
ordinarily be possible – the COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique point from which to 
undertake a comparative assessment.   
 
1.2. Overview  
The discussion in this paper focuses its attention on regional examples from three different 
regions, governance cultures, and legal systems. The regional responses from Germany, 
the constituent nations of the UK (notably, Scotland and England), and selected countries in 
South America – with an emphasis on Colombia – are considered here through specific 
instances of emergency reaction.  
 
First, an exploration of the manners in which governments responded through emergency 
mechanisms – depending on the particular constitutional set up. Second, through an 
examination of technology as a specific element of the pandemic emergency response. Both 
of these dimensions are considered from national perspectives, with a critical eye on the 
transparency, accountability, and scrutiny usually deployed in these systems in non-
pandemic times in Germany and the UK. South America is considered in greater depth from 
the perspectives of governance with a lesser emphasis on technological interventions - 
given the plethora of governance approaches available for comment.    
 
The core argument is that while existing governmental responses and political systems all 
have quirks and unique features in addressing the legalities of the pandemic, the competing 
tensions have led to substantial challenges in balancing the public health agenda against the 
protection of fundamental freedoms. While the overarching goal is to protect citizens’ health 
and welfare, what we see is also a competition between scientific advice, political 
opportunity, and an unprecedented desire for control – at least in Western democracies. It is 
to be hoped that the pandemic response can be reversed because – as this paper argues – 
if not, the changes to the norms are potentially hugely damaging to society, and fundamental 
freedoms. 
 
1.3. COVID-19 and ‘Rights’: Governing the Balance 
The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged norms of governance like few other instances 
previously seen. The greatest challenges posed by the impact of emergency responses fall 
upon some of our fundamental rights – taken here to be: public health; privacy and data 
protection; transparent government, and free movement.  
 
The discussion highlights the ways in which emergency modes of governance have come to 
the fore over the course of the pandemic and considers the manners in which these 
emergency reactions impact upon these fundamental rights. These rights are no less 
important in non-pandemic times, but during the COVID-19 emergency, they have taken on 
a greater level of sanctity, especially where they have been put at risk in consistent and 
enduring ways, rarely seen before on such widespread national and regional scales. The 
comparison of responses in Germany, the UK, and South America – but especially Colombia 
– highlights the shared value placed on these rights across different countries and allows for 
insights to be made as to common responses and concerns. In making such comparisons, 
the balancing of rights and responses is considered, with lessons – common and distinct – 
being drawn to offer a holistic overview of response by governments.2 This paper considers 
lessons for maintaining a balance between fundamental freedoms – and concludes with 
lessons from the pandemic for emergency governance. 




2. The Pandemic Problem – Comparing Reactions from Germany, the UK and 
Colombia  
Countries have vastly different responses to the pandemic. For some countries, this 
pandemic is a governance test rarely seen before. Governmental systems all over the world 
have been challenged in reacting to the pandemic while attempting to uphold the legal 
foundations on which their society is built. Amongst this challenge, the competing interests 
of protecting public health, maintaining law and order, supporting a functioning state, and 
upholding fundamental rights have persisted as priorities. Many of the immediate policies 
introduced to react to the pandemic outbreak restricted the fundamental rights enshrined in 
constitutions, and in international legal instruments, often granted after a long history of 
struggle for such protections.  
 
The balancing act in managing these interests across Germany, the UK, and Colombia is 
considered in turn here.  
 
2.1. COVID-19 in Germany  
The onset of COVID-19 in Germany was, in comparison to neighbouring countries like 
Austria, relatively mild. Germany has, on average, around 1,000 new cases per 100,000 
inhabitants per day while the rate in Austria is around 3,000 cases per day (Johns Hopkins 
University of Medicine, 2020). That said, debates persist over the exertion of influence by 
the government. As Germany is a federalist country, the response to the pandemic also 
reflects a battle over legal responsibilities. Significantly, this has arisen in respect to the 
Infection Protection Law (Infektionschutzgesetz) (IPL) 2000, which was only occasionally 
changed before the breakout. Given the limited legislative attention this legislation received, 
lines of responsibility in the early days of the COVID-19 reaction were unclear. From 2000 to 
2020 the IPL had changed 25 times while in 2020 alone, there were eight changes 
(Infektionschutzgesetz, 2020). Still, the law remains heavily debated, and responsibility for 
its enforcement remains unclear (Deutscher Bundestag. 2020a.)  
 
Given these governmental and legal obstacles, the COVID-19 response has not been 
problem-free in Germany. The discussion here will focus on selected elements of the 
COVID-19 reaction and responses from German lawmakers. It will therefore be considered 
from two perspectives. First, Germany’s political culture and constitutional arrangements will 
be considered, and second, discussions will turn to the Corona-Warn-App deployed as part 
of the German track and trace response.  
 
2.1.1. COVID-19 in Germany - A Governance Crisis? 
The COVID-19 crisis revealed a fundamental flaw in the German model, posing the 
federalist ideal as inflexible (Behnke, 2020). Interestingly, the German government worked 
with the local governments of federal states while bypassing the German Parliament (Taz, 
2020). In terms of a ‘response’ the Parliament is typically an integral part of the decision-
making and local governance process. It has a legal right to be informed and to raise issues, 
but due to the time pressures of COVID-19 responses, this right was temporarily suspended. 
It has therefore become evident that the usual procedures implemented to protect and 
uphold democracy, democratic rights, and fundamental freedoms have had to be adjusted – 
or, arguably, curtailed – due to the current situation. The bypassing of the Parliament is a 
clear indicator of the pitched battle between the public health agenda and infection 
containment, and the upholding of fundamental freedoms. Despite this, the German 
government has circumvented the democratic framework, arguably weakening it, and 
showing that the Parliament is not an ‘essential’ element of the governance structure in 
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Germany’s model. Especially based on the undemocratic regimes in the history of Germany, 
this development sparked a major discourse throughout society. 
 
The German government ‘acted first’ and asked for permission later (Casdorff, 2020) – a 
strategy which may have helped to keep the pandemic at bay, but one which has led to 
equal resentment by the Parliament and the public (BR24, 2020b) Such upset has led to an 
increasing closeness between the right-wing party AfD and the Anti-COVID-19 
demonstration group “Querdenken” (COVID-deniers) who claim that there is a “Merkel-
Dictatorship” happening. (Jansenn, 2020). With a perceived lack of democratic backing, 
such decisions are vulnerable, with citizens increasingly using their rights to fight against 
them,3 and protect their freedoms.  
 
Such developments can be observed in the aftermath of responses such as the introduction 
of mandatory face mask requirements, and citizens suing (unsuccessfully) against those 
perceived curtailments (Illner, 2021). The legal basis is rooted in the IPL and it is still unclear 
if this law is sufficient to legitimately interfere with fundamental rights (Haufe, 2020b). 
Suddenly, the mandated provisions introduced by the national government and regional 
governments were trialled in front of local courts, (Haufe 2020a) provoking unrest and 
widespread public protests (Knight, 2020). Even though there is a clear policy from the 
national government (Die Bundesregierung, 2020b) regulations vary from city to city, for 
example, in the city of Passau (Passau Rathaus Politik, 2021) there are strict restrictions, 
limiting movement as well as access to the city, yet in other places, like Siegen, people can 
move about freely. These are contradictory reactions yet, governmental and legal 
developments have led to societal dissatisfaction, not least because nobody knows which 
rules apply in which city or regional area. The federal model of different levels of response 
leading to differing regulations has caused not only a lack of clarity, but dissatisfaction 
because of the confusion. This has been compounded by a circumvention of the usual 
checks and balances whereby the parliament has been brushed aside in favour of speed. 
Consequently, other methods have proved necessary to assist with the pandemic 
management – for instance, there is now an App available called “Darf ich das?” showing 
information about the regulations based on your location, such is the divergent response 
across municipal and regional governments.  
 
The ‘containment’ strategy (Die Bundesregierung, 2020a) changed in Fall 2020, moving 
from a widespread national prohibition to one focusing on regional outbreaks. Consequently, 
some cities had to implement stricter rules due to superclusters than others. For example, 
Berchtesgadender Land locked down in October for two weeks to flatten the curve (BR24, 
2020a). In Leipzig, the city allowed a concert in August as an experiment to analyse the 
virus (Grenier, 2020). Even though this helped to slow the curve, people became even more 
wary about these regional differences. The October lockdown did not prevent a second 
wave and in November, Germany went into (another) partial lockdown, (DW News, 2020) 
which led to further debate in the courts as to the legal basis for such further interferences in 
movement (Schütze, 2020). Even though the goal is to keep schools open as long as 
possible and suspend cultural events may sound reasonable, it is seen as the unjust 
treatment of certain groups – and of course, has limitations that reduce the protections for 
liberty, curtailing fundamental freedoms. 
 
Given the disparate impact of partial lockdowns, it has become evident that COVID-19 has 
intensified social injustice (Myers, 2020). The crisis highlights the importance of legal 
decisions, but also of governmental transparency and accountability, even when reacting 
timeously to crisis situations. In Germany, the government was able to bypass the standard 
procedure of enforcing regulations and govern the country in this crisis (Jacobsen, 2020). 
While a minority of the public resisted these measures, the majority is accepting of the 
imposed rules – despite the criticisms of curtailment of freedoms. Majority support is 
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gradually decreasing in number (Köcher, 2020), yet there remains a route for the 
government to enforce a top-down strategy and give its COVID-19 reaction legal effect.   
 
Obeyance of the law remains the cornerstone of any legal system, but so too are checks 
and balances that ensure liberty and protect freedoms. Consequently, the court will always 
lag behind the pandemic, but nonetheless it has a significant role to play in protecting 
citizens and ensuring that there is some scrutiny of legal measures, even after their 
introduction. As the IPL was deemed to need amendment, the judiciary has been left to play 
catch-up. By positioning judicial and constitutional concerns as a hinderance to the COVID-
19 response, it is unsurprising that there has been – and continues to be – uncertainty and 
tentativeness in Germany about the enforceability of COVID-19 laws, and the role of the 
Parliament in law-making. 
 
That said, Germany is not the only country that was ill-prepared in terms of battling a 
pandemic – so too was, for example, the UK.  However, the German response and its 
constitutional nature highlights the struggle of balancing swift policymaking against creating 
a legal basis for these policies across differing levels of governance. While the 
circumvention of parliamentary scrutiny may have become a necessity during the pandemic, 
judicial accountability remains – it is therefore to the credit of the judicial system that courts 
have remained able to hear complaints in respect of the enforceability of COVID-19 
restrictions during the pandemic, and – to an extent – assuage some of the concerns 
surrounding interferences with fundamental rights. It is therefore, apparent that the court 
system needs time to consider these interferences, with such time leaving interferences 
unchecked.   
 
2.1.2. Corona-Warn-App  
The challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic also highlight the limitations of the 
German government mechanisms in responding to time-sensitive emergencies. This is 
notable with the Corona-Warn-App, which complied with data-protection laws precisely and 
was even praised by data-protection experts for doing so (Rpzeka, 2020). Despite this, the 
app struggled to track chains of infection because of the anonymised and decentralised 
structure necessary to protect privacy and uphold data protections (Beckedahl, 2020). 
Exposure notifications from the app informed users of potential infection, but users are not 
told where and when they were exposed. Striking a balance between the utility of a track 
and trace system while maintaining fundamental protections has been shown to be 
particularly difficult – not just in Germany, but also in the UK (see below at 2.2.2).  
 
Interestingly, German politicians and media debated the potential harm caused to data 
protection protections in light of COVID-19 amidst reports of lists of infected people being 
passed to local police to ‘assist’ with responding to the pandemic (Delcker, 2020). Such an 
example indicates that data protection, privacy, and information rights are placed at a lower 
level of importance than might otherwise be the case in a non-pandemic situation.4 Of 
greater concern to the track and trace system is the way in which data was being passed 
and circumvented outside of the Corona-Warn-App. COVID-19 responses through app 
tracking systems prove concerning, not least given the lack of utility of the German app, but 
also the visible erosion of protections for privacy evident in responding to the pandemic, 
suggesting a hierarchy of fundamental rights – public health playing out as ‘superior’ to 
privacy and data protection, albeit in times of emergency. Some even stated that data 
protection is the last ‘holy cow’ of Germany (Iken, 2020) but despite this, data protection 
concerns seem to play second place during COVID-19. From a legal perspective, it is clear 
that the app is legally compliant with the developers of the app aware of their potential 
liabilities.  
 
The contrast between rights which are protected and regarded as inviolable represents a 
fluctuating set of principles – one which changes depending on the particular elements of the 
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pandemic at any specific point in time. In considering which rights should be restricted in a 
pandemic, and how much restriction is justifiable, it is clear that there is a presumptive 
hierarchy, played out through emergency responses.  
 
2.2. COVID-19 in the UK: A Notifiable Emergency 
The management of the COVID-19 pandemic across the UK, from the central UK 
Government, and across the devolved jurisdictions, is a messy picture. That said, there are 
some similarities – as well as notable differences – in the ways in which the pandemic 
response has been managed, both within the UK and across other countries such as 
Germany and Colombia. These are especially prevalent in terms of the track and trace 
mechanisms, the legislation and emergency regulations that have been required, and the 
response to concerns surrounding public health, fundamental rights, and especially, data 
protection.  
 
The UK Government has stumbled through the management of the COVID-19 pandemic 
(Barker, Uribe-Jongbloed & Scholz, 2020) Claims by Prime Minister Boris Johnson of a 
‘world-beating’ system to tackle COVID-19 (Reuters, 2020) have not come to fruition, with 
the increasingly fragmented system of competing rules across unmonitored borders within 
the UK proving to be difficult to enforce.  
 
The discussion here will focus on selected elements of the COVID-19 reaction across the 
UK through two examples. First, the emergency regulations introduced in response to 
COVID-19 becoming a ‘notifiable disease’,5 and second in respect of the evolution – and 
arguably disastrous – roll out of NHSX track and trace apps.  
 
2.2.1. Emergency Law-Making – Vires v Accountability  
COVID-19 was listed as a Notifiable Disease under the Public Health (Control of Disease) 
Act 1984 at 6.15pm on 5 March 2020, through a statutory instrument. The addition of 
COVID-19 to the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010 requires all doctors to 
report cases of COVID-19 to Public Health England. This reaction marked the first of the 
serious steps taken by the UK Government in response to the emerging pandemic. The use 
of secondary legislation in the form of a statutory instrument (SI) to add to the Notifiable 
Diseases list was also the first of many fast-track pieces of legislation that have been 
unveiled in 2020 in response to different aspects of the pandemic. It also highlights the use 
of secondary legislation – not per se problematic unless the review provisions are 
circumvented to allow legislative interventions without scrutiny.  
 
Interestingly, while the UK Government made the change to the Notifiable Diseases list on 5 
March, the Scottish Government made changes to the Public Health (Scotland) Act 2008 on 
20 February 2020, which came in to force on 22 February6 to ensure, in the words of the 
Health Secretary, that ‘the health service in Scotland can quickly respond’ (Scottish 
Government, 2020). While Scotland was ahead of the UK Government, and was pro-active, 
Wales adopted a similar timescale to that of the UK Government in respect of England, and 
did not list COVID-19 as a Notifiable Disease until 5 March 2020, with the Regulations 
(Health Protection (Notification) (Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2020, No 232 (W. 54)) 
coming into force on 6 March 2020. The different – and divergent approaches on this aspect 
of notification is one which highlights the distinct approaches taken by the devolved 
governments within the UK. Similarly, to Germany, different regional governments have 
adopted differing measures within their territorial scope.  
 
Importantly, the UK Government included within the Coronavirus Act 2020, the powers that 
would allow the devolved legislatures of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to respond to 
the outbreaks of COVID-19 within their respective geographical territories (Coronavirus Act 
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2020)7 – all as part of the Coronavirus action plan (Department of Health & Social Care, 
2020). What this – in effect – resembles is the ability to make emergency regulations quickly, 
and without the need to follow the full legislative process in each of the Scottish Parliament, 
Welsh Parliament, or Northern Ireland Assembly. The ability of the appropriate Government 
minister to table legislation in a fast-track procedure was one of the measures taken early in 
the pandemic’s management to ensure that appropriate steps could be implemented. While 
there is a necessary – and understandable – need for speedier than usual legislation, given 
that some of these regulations impede upon liberty, and freedoms such as the restrictions on 
movement, the lack of the usual scrutiny processes comes into tension with the freedoms 
that are regarded as ‘norms’ in everyday life pre-pandemic. This is particularly objectionable 
given the democratic process of scrutinising draft legislation, especially where draft laws 
have the potential to interfere with fundamental rights such as movement, and privacy, or 
erode democratic principles. For instance, the Coronavirus Act 2020 included provisions to 
suspend or postpone elections due in England in 2020 (s60).  
 
The approach to COVID-19 regulations – through secondary legislation, with much less 
scrutiny – is one which falls into the category of emergency powers available to the relevant 
Minister. The powers granted under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, allow 
regulations to be introduced without parliamentary consideration where there is a ‘serious 
and imminent threat to public health’ (s45C) in the interests of – it is suggested here – a 
‘rapid’ response.  While there is a circumvention of the usual legislative debate and scrutiny, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care has 
acted ultra vires. There are also distinct similarities with the acts taken in Germany to bypass 
Parliament – both the UK and Germany have utilised mechanisms to ensure rapid reactions 
but without the usual legislative processes being followed. 
 
In respect of the UK’s reaction, Jeff King, in particular, is clear that the regulations 
introduced through the procedure8 in the overarching legislation are lawful, (King, 2020) and 
there is no concern about whether there has been an abuse of process or an abuse of 
power. Contrary opinions emerge that there have been steps taken in introducing legislation 
which go beyond the scope of the powers granted to introduce secondary legislation.  
 
Francis Hoar argues convincingly that the Coronavirus Regulations represent a 
disproportionate interference with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hoar, 2020). 
Similarly, Robert Craig indicates that there are problems with the vires of the Regulations 
and indicates that there are some serious constitutional concerns about the emergency 
regulations introduced by the Secretary of State (Craig, 2020). Craig and Hoar are not alone 
in voicing such an argument, with David Anderson (2020) indicating that the phrasing of 
some of the restrictions are too broadly drafted, and as such would raise questions as to 
their validity, especially because of the difficulties of provisions which are non-exhaustive in 
nature. Anderson finds common ground with Tom Hickman, Emma Dixon and Rachel Jones 
(2020), who express similar concerns about whether the Regulations are vires or not, 
arguing that there are ’significant question mark[s]’ over whether or not the special 
requirements in the Regulations can be legitimately enforced. 
 
Meanwhile, the concerns of Hickman, Dixon and Jones (2020) focus on the notion that 
people can be forced to stay at home, querying whether this is a legitimate restriction – and 
interference with fundamental freedoms – given the breadth of the limitation,9 and 
highlighting that such restrictions on movement could amount to what the Supreme Court 
has considered as common law imprisonment.10 Other concerns are raised by Benet 
Brandreth and Lord Sandhurst (2020), who take the view that the Public Health Act (Control 
of Disease) Act 1984 does not provide a basis for the broad ranging limitations and powers 
enacted in the Regulations. They take their argument further and indicate that where the 
Government fails to curtail the powers, challenges to the lawfulness of the Regulations could 
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amount to civil liabilities for those deemed to be ‘relevant persons’ such as – for example – 
police officers (Brandreth and Sandhurst, 2020). Concerns about the ways in which 
restrictions on movement, gatherings, travel, and the ability to introduce additional, wide-
ranging regulations11 persist – not least because of the potential for these to be subjected to 
abuse.  
 
The merits and vires – or otherwise – of the UK Government reactions through secondary 
legislation without review evidences the ways in which governments have been compelled to 
react to an unfolding and unpredictable situation. Similarities exist between two of the 
comparator jurisdictions considered here – Germany and the UK have both shown that they 
can – and will – act to circumvent the usual governance mechanisms and processes to 
prioritise their reactions to emergency situations. Further similarities emerge in respect of 
track and trace systems. 
 
2.2.2. Track & Trace in the UK – X Marks the Spot  
One of the cornerstones of the UK response to the COVID-19 pandemic – similar to the 
response in other nations, including Germany – has been to develop a track and trace 
system. While contact tracing itself is not new and has been widely used for dealing with 
infectious diseases generally, (Rorres, Romano and Miller et al, 2018) the roll-out of the 
track and trace systems based on apps has given rise to further concerns relating to 
fundamental rights, and the erosion of protections in the name of ‘public health’ amid times 
of emergency.  
 
The UK NHS Track and Trace app, unveiled in early June 2020, was swiftly abandoned 
(Donnelly, and Wright 2020) due to technical issues when its trial was rolled out across the 
Isle of Wight. The abandoning of the app was predicated by a number of significant flaws, 
which included the ability of people to download it more than once, but also the ability of 
people not based on the Isle of Wight to also download the app – compromising the trial 
data (Morgan, 2020). The technical flaws were just some of the concerns raised about the 
notion of a track and trace app. Broader concerns relating to privacy also arose, not least 
because of the Government’s backing of the app. In that respect, the intrusive nature of the 
app – and its tracing potential – is particularly chilling, and even more so in light of the 
restrictions on movement. A more reliable, privacy-conscious approach to tracing systems 
was implemented instead.  
 
In Scotland for example, NHS Scotland Protect Scotland app was unveiled to allow contact 
tracing, but on the basis of anonymous tracing (NHS Inform), rather than capturing 
significant amounts of personal data, and information which are subsumed into data storage 
– just one of the concerns that the Open Rights Group raised in respect of the NHSX app in 
England (Open Rights Group, 2020a). It is particularly interesting that the NHS Scotland 
Test and Protect website makes specific and comprehensive explanations as to the ways in 
which data will be used (NHS Scotland) addressing issues from the mildly curious to the 
privacy conscious app user.12 This is in stark contrast to the NHSX app, but is also more 
aligned with the German Corona-Warn-App’s privacy conscious initial offering. 
 
In England and Wales, the NHSX app was abandoned, in favour of the NHS COVID-19 app 
(NHS Test and Trace). Of greater significance is that the UK Government learnt from its 
previous failures in this area, especially when dealing with the privacy rights and concerns of 
its citizens – whose co-operation it needs in order to allow the track and trace apps to 
function as part of the COVID-19 response. In introducing a different app, the UK 
Government has now complied with its obligations to undertake a Data Privacy Impact 
Assessment13 in respect of the NHS COVID-19 app in England and Wales, something it had 
previously omitted in respect of the NHSX app through mid-2020. This prior omission in 
respect of the former tracing app in England and Wales was one of the elements found to be 
unlawful (Open Rights Group, 2020b). 
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In addressing the unlawful elements of the NHSX app, the UK Government has managed to 
respect some fundamental rights in respect of the COVID-19 response by complying with 
the Data Privacy Impact Assessment requirements, and distinguishing between personal 
and special category data, as required under the Data Protection Act 2018.14 That said, the 
overall ‘success’ of the COVID-19 track and trace programmes in the UK is questionable, 
especially given the relatively poor performance of apps in England – even discounting the 
NHSX fiasco within that assessment. One survey indicates that the track and trace system 
reaches only half of all contacts ‘at best’ (McNeill and Gray, 2020), while reports suggest 
that the NHS track and trace app has cost £35 million (Lazarevska, 2020), and is full of 
glitches – causing spikes in case numbers (Cochrane, 2020) – while running on a platform 
that is not necessarily fit for purpose (Lazarevska, 2020). 
 
It is questionable as to whether the damage to privacy rights, and the trade-off between 
public health needs and protection for fundamental rights – including the right to respect for 
your private life (European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8) – have been worth the 
cost of the NHS track and trace apps. The shambolic management of the app in England 
and Wales is a further indicator of the way in which scrutiny, transparency, and abuses of 
fundamental rights have been perpetuated as part of the response to the COVID-19 crisis, 
evident not only in the UK, but also through the German experiences with the Corona-Warn-
App. 
 
The responses, reactions, and experiences of Germany and the UK – in governmental 
responses as well as technological mechanisms – have shown similarities in the handling of 
the pandemic from two countries, and one region. The discussion now shifts to consider a 
vastly different experience from a different region – South America – where the focus falls on 
governmental responses to the emergency.  
3.3. COVID-19 in South America 
South America has been considered as a site of contrasts as the pandemic has unfolded. 
While Chile, Peru and Ecuador were quickly seen as the countries where the COVID-19 
spread managed to overcome hospital space, Colombia and Argentina applied some of the 
longest lockdowns to contain the spread of the virus. Each of these instances indicate 
differing government responses in different territories, all of which aimed to address the 
unfolding pandemic.  
Uruguay meanwhile was heralded (Parks, 2020) as a leading example of appropriate 
containment (Moreno and Moratorio et al, 2020). As of 29 November 2020, Peru, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia were all amongst the top 25 countries with the 
most deaths per million people, with Peru coming third in the world with over 1,000 deaths 
and Colombia in the lower 21st place with over 715 deaths per million (Worldometers, 2020). 
This represents a different rate of success in addressing the pandemic through 
governmental responses – which have taken a different approach to those seen in Germany 
and the UK.  Not only does this indicate a continent of contrast, but it showcases – at least in 
part – the manner in which the different pandemic responses in various territories have 
played out, with the South American emphasis falling on immediate, very lengthy lockdowns, 
and a lesser emphasis on tracing systems. Equally, the responses across South America, 
Germany, and the UK all show a particular focus on protecting the health system in the early 
phases of the outbreak.  
 
The discussion here focuses on the government responses across South America, 
highlighting the different nature of the reactions to the pandemic to those adopted in 
Germany and the UK. The discussion that follows addresses governmental reactions to 
borders within nations and within municipalities – similar to those considered above – before 
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moving to consider the approaches adopted to protecting fundamental freedoms. The data 
protection discussion is more nuanced given the differing cultural and political systems in 
South America. 
 
3.3.1. COVID Responses in South America – Governing the ‘Borders’ 
The predominant challenge for local and national governments across Colombia and 
Argentina arises in the largest capital cities, particularly those with geographical features 
making border controls across municipalities particularly tricky. In Colombia for instance, the 
cities of Leticia (pop. ca. 50,000), at the southernmost tip of the country on the Amazon 
riverbed, and Puerto Nariño (pop. ca. 8,000), on one of the tributaries to the Amazon river 
northwest of Leticia, represent the largest settlements on the Colombian side of this 
trinational ‘soft border’ as part of the Departamento (political unit) Amazonas. This ‘soft 
border’ is one that governments have struggled to address in terms of controls on 
movement, even after the lockdown. When the lockdown measures were introduced in 
Colombia15 and, hence, to Leticia, the border city of Tabatinga in Brazil (pop 65,840), was 
still open for business, following the laissez faire attitude of the Bolsonaro government 
(Anderson, 2020). While the central street connecting the two towns was closed to all forms 
of traffic, the many informal paths that link them were still used by people to bring goods 
from one country to the other, circumventing national government orders for lockdown. As a 
further challenge to the movement restrictions, backyards became additional informal routes 
between Colombia and Brazil (El Tiempo, 2020a) allowing for free movement between two 
countries with very different government responses in the initial stages of the pandemic. The 
porous border with dirt paths and backyards was unpoliceable, not only in terms of enforcing 
the movement restrictions (El Tiempo, 2020a) (and subsequent restrictions on commerce) 
but also in terms of containing the virus on either side of the border. 
 
Further examples of ineffective and unenforceable government reactions to the pandemic 
emerge in other Amazonian contexts, the Peruvian city of Iquitos, and the Brazilian city of 
Manaus – both considered hotspots of the COVID-19 epidemic in their respective countries 
(Valencia, 2020). The trinational trade route between Tabatinga, Iquitos and Manaus is the 
main connection for the local inhabitants. It circumvents traditional and formal border 
crossings, and has proven throughout the pandemic to be one where it is difficult to enforce 
movement restrictions. The area can be easily defined with reference to Canclini’s 
description of many parts of South America as simultaneously “different, unequal, and 
disconnected” (Canclini, 2020), with a large indigenous population, high poverty levels and 
low internet access. These factors serve to indicate one of the biggest obstacles in enforcing 
movement restrictions – lack of opportunities. Remaining at home during the lockdown is an 
impossibility when informal work accounts for survival, and where internet penetration is way 
below the major cities. When mandating movement restrictions, enforcement is necessary. 
By reacting through lockdowns, the government has addressed only one element of its 
response, failing to follow through on ensuring its restrictions are complied with, particularly 
in border regions. This example serves to highlight a common theme in government 
reactions to the pandemic – the confusing mismatch of different restrictions in different 
bordering regions, municipalities, and legal jurisdictions, something very much evident in 
Germany, and the UK, as well as the Amazon region of South America. 
 
The poor enforcement of government movement restrictions did not prevent the transit of 
people from Leticia to Tabatinga and allowed for COVID-19 to make it across informal 
borders. By June 18 2020, Leticia had the highest number of cases and deaths per 10,000 
people in the country with 469 and 25 respectively.16 When cases started to rise, it became 
clear that resources at the Leticia Hospital were inadequate, suggesting that even the trade-
off between healthcare protection and the restrictions on freedoms had not paid off despite 
the lockdown, and exemplifying the dangers of failing to police informal border crossings.  
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Eight months after the borders were notionally ‘locked down’; a seroprevalence study by the 
National Health Institute (INS) showed that 60% of Leticia’s population had COVID-19 
antibodies - very close to achieving functional herd immunity (El Tiempo, 2020b). Although 
these results have not yet led to an easing of restrictions, they show how their original 
situation as hotspots puts them in a better longer-term position than the rest of the country, 
suggesting that the lack of enforcement of border restrictions may have not had a 
detrimental impact on infection rates. Nevertheless, the government reaction to COVID-19 in 
imposing a lockdown in Colombia highlights the fragile nature of national responses without 
greater thought being given to regional responses – exemplified here through the difficulties 
exposed by informal borders and contradictory rules across different neighbouring 
governments and municipal authorities. It also highlights that a response in one country, for 
example Germany, cannot be uniformly replicated with expectations of success in others 
with different characteristics or features.  
 
3.3.2. Balancing Reaction(s) – Emergency Law Making and Fundamental Rights? 
While in Germany the municipal and national responses to the COVID-19 situation have 
been questioned, and the UK’s confusing approach across its four nations has come under 
scrutiny, in Colombia it was the centralised approach to the pandemic that seemed to be 
under fire. In all of the comparator states considered, the governmental responses have 
taken on a different emphasis, but all have been subject to assessment for the manner in 
which balances are being accommodated between public health and interferences with 
freedoms. 
 
In Colombia, the emergency powers of the government also included a modification of the 
information petition time frames. Institutionally, public and private bodies are required to 
answer petitions and complaints by citizens within a period of 15 days, with the risk of being 
found in contempt or the allegation being granted to the citizen due to administrative silence. 
However, under the emergency regulations (Decree 491 of 2020), the time window was 
expanded to 30 days, with powers of the relevant civil servant permitting extensions of a 
(potential) further 30 days (Guzmán, 2020). The Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP) has 
stated that this difficulty in accessing to information is a threat to press freedom. The 
argument advanced is that guaranteeing basic rights, (FLIP, 2020) such as the right to 
information, is particularly important in a global pandemic but has been prejudiced in favour 
of ‘other priorities’ – a common theme in Germany and the UK in respect of data and tracing 
apps. 
 
The Interamerican Commission in Human Rights (CIDH, 2020) understood early the risk that 
such emergency regulations posed to human rights and issued Resolution No.1 of 2020 to 
bring attention to the basic limitations that these restrictions would have under the pandemic.  
The risk is significant, with emergency regulations pitting public health risks against 
movement restrictions in lockdown with the changes in governmental procedures to ensure 
timely changes in laws. Under exceptional measures that skip legislative debates, South 
American presidents have taken actions that would otherwise be unacceptable (see above 
at 2.2.1.). These measures include some steps seen in the UK – such as the postponement 
of elections – as well as measures that are more concerning, such as attempting to curtail 
the right to assemble to prevent demonstrations. While the justification for this has been 
made on the grounds of the public health risks of mass gatherings, it has been matched with 
demonising those who are protesting against their governments (Murillo, 2020), suggesting 
that the reasons to curtail protests are less COVID-19 specific and represent something 
more nefarious.  
 
Argentina and Colombia pressed for extreme lockdowns in mid-March 2020 that started to 
subside somewhere in July, but were prolonged well into September, with international 
passenger flights returning only in October to Colombia, and November to Argentina 
(Gonzalez, Hopkins and Horwitz et al, 2020). Despite lockdowns, their respective contagion 
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curves fared similarly, making it evident – with hindsight – that an inability to contain the 
virus was clear from the onset. The limitations on movement, travel, and other fundamental 
freedoms were governmental reactions to attempt to enact containment. These restrictions 
were presented as being in the public interest to protect public health. To achieve this aim, 
fundamental freedoms were limited for almost half a year in 2020. Contrastingly, Uruguay 
won praise for its comparative ‘success’ versus its neighbouring countries (Brazil and 
Argentina), and the effectiveness of its tracking and tracing infected patients. While the 
border challenges of Colombia and Peru fostered the creation of virus hotspots, Uruguay 
managed to contain the spread, thanks to its efficient healthcare system and a political 
consensus (Anarte, 2020) aimed at governing during the emergency.   
 
In situations where there are health risks, even unprecedented ones, the ability to govern 
without scrutiny puts precarious fundamental freedoms at even greater risk. What is also 
apparent from the diverse approaches developed across South America, is that there is no 
‘right’ way to do things when faced with unprecedented emergency situations. That said, it is 
also clear that what appears as an emergency response in the interests of public health can 
be implemented during times of crisis and yet can still undermine public trust, compounded 
by the absence of the usual checks and balances.  
 
4. COVID-19 Responses as Comparative Lessons for Pandemic 
Governance? 
The responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have naturally shifted in focus as the pandemic 
has unfolded (and continues to unfold). Initial reactions focussed on the medical aspects, 
often starting with coverage in territories that were affected early into the spread, with a 
changing narrative continuing to emerge. The changing responses and phases are mirrored 
by the impact – across government responses, changes to rules and restrictions, and 
emerging protests amid prolonged limitations (BBC News, 2020; Huggler, 2020; Latin 
American News, 2020). These shifts are reflective of other changes witnessed during the 
unfolding of the pandemic, which have resulted in a new set of social norms, but also a new 
set of governmental norms across different countries – Germany, the UK, and Colombia – 
here Europe and South America – and governing bodies within each. Accountability does 
not disappear during emergency situations. Instead, there is a shift in the ways in which 
those in power are held to account, and that is what is playing out across states in Europe 
and South America. 
 
4.1. A ‘Norm’ for Pandemic Responses? 
The variety of responses to the pandemic by different governments has arguably resulted in 
very different measures being used to tackle the pandemic. In Germany, contentious 
alterations to the Infektionschutzgesetz resulted in controversy, as has the fiasco of the UK 
tracking app, and the lack of enforcement of border restrictions in South America. In the UK, 
the discontent surrounding restrictions on movement, and the stay at home instructions, 
have been scrutinised from a position of incompatibility with human rights protections, as 
have the challenges to data protection in Germany, and the bypassing of usual legislative 
scrutiny for emergency declarations in South America.  
 
What is common across the jurisdictions and regions considered here has been the outcry at 
the restrictiveness of the emergency measures. This is a snapshot of some of the fallout 
from the pandemic, and the risks that persist in respect of fundamental rights and their 
protections. The unprecedented nature of the pandemic, and the ease with which COVID-19 
spread across the world has triggered something of a governmental crisis along with a public 
health crisis. The crisis responses focused (understandably) on the medical aspects of the 
pandemic, prioritising public health. Less attention was paid to the scrutiny of emergency 
measures, emergency legislation, and rapid government reactions to an unfolding situation. 
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The response therefore was one that was facilitated as a stepping-stone to allow other 
mechanisms to respond. In all of this, where changes to governing and laws were required, 
no longer were these measures – which have significant impacts upon fundamental 
freedoms – subjected to the usual, often protracted, debate, scrutiny, and procedures. All of 
this has come in response to the pandemic, and while ostensibly reasonable at the time in 
which action is required, raises questions concerning the maintenance of law and order, and 
the preferred routes of law-making.  
 
The essence of law and order rests where there is accountability (Dicey, 1959; Pfander, 
2003; Delaney, 2014). This manifests itself in the procedures of oversight, scrutiny, and 
transparency in governmental processes. It is within this that quirks of domestic law-making 
and procedural niceties are followed to allow the development of legislation, which is 
presented for debate and scrutiny as per the rules of the specific legislature – be it through 
debates in the House of Commons (UK Parliament) or through scrutiny in the second and 
third readings of proposed acts before the Deutscher Bundestag, or its various committees.  
 
During the pandemic, the usual routes of scrutiny, methods of assessing draft legislative 
impact, and the finer points of soon-to-be law have been temporarily suspended, or fit into 
alternative frameworks.17 It is possible to perceive of these responses as ones which 
undermine the veracity and scrutiny of legislation, particularly where restrictions on 
movement, on economic fluidity, and on social gatherings have all been introduced not as 
Acts of Parliament, but rather through emergency regulations applicable to a specific legal 
territory or region. This raises questions about the process of drafting law, but also about the 
powers which are being exerted by members of the government of the day charged with the 
issuance of such regulations.  
 
4.2. Transparency before Scrutiny? 
The political staging of announcements of emergency responses has, on numerous 
occasions, come the day before the publication of the legal regulations. What has been 
particularly striking during the pandemic is the increased use of press conferences and 
press announcements in disseminating these changes in restrictions (Wetherby, Child and 
Cruse et al, 2020). In some respects, this is unsurprising. But what has been revealing 
during the media broadcasts and political showcasing of COVID-19 press conferences by 
national and regional governments is that there has been a significant effort to explain the 
legal measures to the wider populace in advance of their coming into force as law. This is 
not something that is always widely seen or reported in non-pandemic situations, and while it 
is – perhaps obviously – because the nature of such regulations demands advance 
explanation, it still signals a shift in norms.  
 
Therefore, at the very time when it seems that legal systems are not being subjected to 
usual levels of scrutiny, it is instead apparent that there are shifting ideas of transparency. 
The protracted legislative drafting stages may have been skipped in favour of emergency 
regulations, but there have still been some efforts – albeit different – to subject these to 
scrutiny. Emergency regulations may not have been subjected to several legislative stages 
and parliamentary debates, but they have been published and covered widely in the print 
and news media, and presented by governments at daily, or periodical press conferences. In 
this way, modes of government, as well as the law itself – and changes to it – have been put 
at the forefront of public awareness in ways rarely seen before. Circumstances may have 
demanded an alternative approach, and while there is no desire to not scrutinise laws, 
making a concerted effort to engage with the public about the restrictions on liberty, and 
social norms, has been one of the good things to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic. It 
may, at the very least, make the law-making process, and the role of parliaments in 
scrutinising the role of governments (and therefore upholding the separation of powers) 
more accessible. In itself, this is a particularly valuable lesson.  
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5. Conclusion: Governing in Emergencies? 
 
The pandemic highlights an inherent struggle in modes of government, and emergency law-
making – a fair, just, and equal treatment of all people in a society requires a delicate 
balance of resources and most importantly time. Time is the one thing that governments do 
not have in a pandemic. The responses need to be quick and often harsh, in order to literally 
preserve life.  
 
The restrictions imposed in various regions, in different governing systems, all show that 
there are common concerns throughout. The ways in which emergency restrictions 
(prejudicing movement and freedoms) are introduced are done in a manner that circumvents 
the usual processes of transparency and accountability. These circumventions are justified 
in the interests of timeliness, and the need to protect society, often from itself. That said, the 
freedoms and rights that have become commonplace have been interfered with, suspended, 
or brushed aside in the pursuit of pandemic control. The holding to account of law-makers – 
no longer full parliamentary processes – has also changed and become much less stringent 
at the very time when arguably it needs to be more so.  
 
This is the governing emergency at its core – the need to respond quickly means that we set 
aside the usual transparency. But in so doing, we put our freedoms at ever-greater risk, 
when the scrutiny should be even greater. This trend is particularly concerning given the 
ever present calls for ‘legitimate’ interferences in rights. All of these changes have come 
about through emergency legal instruments, some of which are not standalone laws, but 
derogations, permitted in times of crisis. Democratic countries with constitutional rights have 
to ponder the consequences of restricting fundamental rights. Is this pandemic an exception 
to the norm, are the policies legitimate and how do the populace respond to their 
government? These questions reflect the quandary that evolves out of such situations, 
especially when transparency is set aside in times of emergency. 
 
The COVID-19 challenge highlights that there needs to be some form of orderly governance 
to fight against the pandemic, but it leads to emergency responses. These responses have 
profound – and potentially – long-lasting impacts on our freedoms, our holding to account 
the government, and the ways in which our governance systems can recover. It is to be 
hoped that the COVID-19 emergency responses – like the pandemic itself – are time-limited, 
and a return to ‘normal’ is swift. It is also to be hoped that lessons can be learnt from the 
myriad of reactions and responses that have been utilised. Lessons from our neighbours can 
have a benefit. The comparative discussions outlined here show that even where there is a 
variety of responses, it is not possible to conceive of a ‘one size’ fits all approach. 
Governments are different – so too are their emergency responses.  
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1 The selection of these jurisdictions also reflects the geographical expertise of each of the 
co-authors and ensured ready access to contemporary developments.  
2 Governments are taken in this paper to include local, regional, and national governments, 
and includes municipal rule-makers, as well as devolved governments and local council 
bodies. 
3 Around Easter, several courts had to deal with the prohibition of church services and that 
the restrictions are against the right of freedom of religion. 
4 Interestingly, to put aside data protection in order to facilitate a tracing app would put 
domestic law into conflict with the European Union, and the General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016, which member states were required to transpose into national law. 
5 Where an infectious disease has the potential to cause significant outbreaks, and / or is 
likely to reach epidemic levels of infection, Public Health England requires notification of 
clinical suspicion under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 together with the 
Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010.  
6 The Public Health etc (Scotland) Act 2008 (Notifiable Diseases and Notifiable Organisms) 
Amendment Regulations 2020, No 51.  
7 Coronavirus Act 2020, ss 94-96 which outline the procedures to be followed where 
regulations are to be made by Ministers of the devolved legislatures.   
8 The Emergency Procedure as outlined in s45R of the Public Health (Control of Disease) 
Act 1984.  
9 Under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, s45G(2).  
10 As in R (Jalloh) v Home Secretary [2020] UKSC 4.  
11 Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, s45F.  
12 Addressing for instance, elements of anonymous and personal identifiable data flows 
through the apps. See e.g. NHS Scotland Test & Protect (2020).   
13 A Data Privacy Impact Assessment is required under s64 Data Protection Act 2018 which 
states that wherever there is a type of data processing “which is likely to result in a high risk 
to the rights and freedoms of individuals” a data protection impact assessment is required.   
14 Special data includes data revealing racial or ethnic origins; political opinions; religious or 
philosophical beliefs; trade union membership; genetic data; biometric data; health; sex life; 
sexual orientation. See Data Protection Act 2018, Schedule 1. See further: Barker, Uribe-
Jongbloed and Scholz (2020). 
15 A first recommendation to prevent contagion for vulnerable groups was issued on March 
13, urging local and regional health services to inform indigenous, ethnic and other protected 
communities to avoid contact with people from outside their territory, remain in their 
individual or collective spaces and develop protocols in the event of potential COvid-19 
cases. Moreover, the preemptive mandatory isolation – as the lockdown is officially dubbed 
– issued on March 22, 2020, required that the whole population stay indoors. 
16 Compare with the second highest, the Special District of Barranquilla, with 51 cases and 2 
deaths per 10,000 people. See: INS, 2020.   
17 See above at: 3.2.1. A Notifiable Disease – Emergency Law-Making.  
